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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
APPEAL AND ERRoR-BiLL OF EXCEPTIONS-CoURT RuLm MAKING SAVING
OF ExCEPTIONs UNNECEssARYo-Trial courts have from time to time made
rules dispensing with the requirement that attorneys request each excep-
tion to be saved, but thereby have misled attorneys into omitting to specify
in their bills of exceptions those errors they wished to have reviewed on
appeal. In a recent case, where such a rule had governed the trial, plain-
tiff, on appeal, alleged error in the trial court's refusal to rule out certain
improper questions put to a witness. Plaintiff's attorney had filed a bill
of exceptions but had apparently failed to specify the alleged errors during
the trial which he wished to have reviewed. Held, the rule of the trial court
was a proper one but it could not dispense with a detailed bill of exceptions.
Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanatorium Co. (Mo. App. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d)
249, 258.
Some states dispense by statute with the necessity of saving exceptions.
R. S. Ill. (Cahill, 1929) c. 110 sec. 81. Others specifically authorize trial
courts to do so by rule. Ark. Stat. (Crawford & Moses, 1929) see. 1318.
Still others specifically require exceptions to be saved. Wyo. Stat. (1920)
see. 5864; Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1923) sec. 646; Ind. Stat.
(Burns, 1926) sec. 685.
The Missouri statute construed in the principal case merely specifies that,
"Whenever, in the progress of any trial in any civil suit pending in any
court of record, either party shall except to the opinion of the court, and
shall write his exception and pray the court to allow and sign the same, the
person composing the court shall, if such bill be true, sign the same." R. S.
Mo. (1919) sec. 1459. In T1yon v. Wabash Ry. (1921) 207 Mo. App. 322, 232
S. W. 786, it was held under this section that exceptions must be saved dur-
ing the trial to adverse rulings and that the trial court cannot obviate this
necessity. See also Green v. Terminal Ry. (1908) 211 Mo. 18, 109 S. W.
715. The decision on the second point was overruled in State ex rel. Brock-
man v. Miller (Mo. 1922) 241 S. W. 920, and trial courts were empowered
to provide by rule for the automatic saving of exceptions. State v.
Rollinger (Mo. 1923) 256 S. W. 460, 461; Myrick v. Hamilton (Mo. App.
1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 165.
The Missouri courts, however, have consistently held that the necessity
of detailed bills of exceptions cannot be avoided by a rule of the trial court
or by any other means. Harrison v. Bartlett (1872) 51 Mo. 170;State ex
rel. Brockman v. Miller, above; Straub v. Laclede Gaslight Co. (Mo. App.
1926) 287 S. W. 1060; 3 C. J. 220.
In all the Missouri cases cited above except State ex rel. Brockman v.
Miller, the appellants appear to have been misled into believing that ex-
ceptions were brought under the review of the appellate court automatically
without their being included specifically in a bill of exceptions. Unless
some means are used to avoid giving a misleading impression of the effect of
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the automatic saving of exceptions, appellate review of many acts of trial
courts will continue to be refused. At the same time it is very desirable
for the sake of convenience that trial courts should adopt a rule dispensing
with the formality of the saving of exceptions. The confusion which
results when such a rule is in force seems to be caused by the excep-
tional character of this procedure. The Illinois statute universalizes this
practice and does away with the difficulty. J. D. F., '32.
APPEAL AND ERROR-JuRISDICTION-EMINENT DOMAIN AS INVOLVING
TrrLs To REAL ESTATE.-In a condemnation suit where the only issue be-
fore the St. Louis Court of Appeals was the propriety of the award of
damages in the trial court, the case was transferred to the Supreme Court
of Missouri on the ground that it involved title to real estate. Const. Mo.
art. 6 sec. 12. Held, if the only question in a condemnation proceeding is
the right to condemn and determine damages, title is not involved. It is
neither "in dispute" nor "in issue." It is merely "affected." Missouri
Power and Light Co. v. Creed (1930) 30 S. W. (2d) 605.
Most of the older cases have determined that title is involved even where
damages or the right of condemnation is the main issue. Hayes 'V. Ellison
(Mo. 1916) 191 S. W. 49; Kansas City v. Railroad (1905) 187 Mo. 146, 86
S. W. 190; State ex rel. v. Rombauer (1894) 124 Mo. 598, 28 S. W. 75; City
of Tarkio v. Clark (1905) 186 Mo. 294, 85 S. W. 329. But these cases
fail to explain how or why the title is involved so as to be in issue, a sub-
ject of controversy. The Rombauer case, in coming to its conclusion, rea-
sons that in condemning land for railroad tracks the rights of exclusive
use and possession, essential elements of perfect title, are taken from the
landowner and vested in the corporation. The title, however, is not "in
issue" directly as opposed to collaterally. It is rather "affected," and
the only question is whether the defendant's land should be subjected to an
easement.
The court previously reasoned that in condemning for a sewer only the
easement and not the fee is affected; but while the fee remains in the
owners, their right to sue is either lessened or taken away, and as a conse-
quence the title is affected to the extent of the injury inflicted. City of
Moberly v. Totter (1915) 266 Mo. 457, 181 S. W. 991. See also Prairie Pipe
Line Co. v. Shipp (Mo. App. 1923) 240 S. W. 473. The instant case, how-
ever, demands that title be more than affected, possibly to the extent that
the condemnation issues be incidental to the question of ownership.
The basic issue is whether courts should accept the Moberly case rule
that title is involved if there is a question whether or not the title should
be or is going to be lessened, or the new rule that title is involved only
where there is the actual question of wherein the title or any portion there-
of is vested. This latter view, that of the instant case, would seem to
narrow the scope of cases which could be appealed on the constitutional
ground to those where the real and central issue is to whom the title be-
longs. This result is commendable in that it will help to relieve the Mis-
souri Supreme Court of an overflow of litigation. H. R. S., '32.
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